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FACTS, FORMALISM, AND THE 
BRANDEIS BRIEF: THE ORIGINS OF A 
MYTH 
Noga Morag-Levine* 
The Brandeis Brief has long been central to historical accounts 
of the struggle and ultimate triumph of progressive jurisprudence over 
legal formalism. Yet this familiar storyline is difficult to reconcile 
with the historical record on two counts. The first is its incompatibil-
ity with the presence of extra-legal evidence in cases and briefs well 
predating that of Brandeis. The second is the fact that, contrary to the 
prevailing account, conservatives were not the vanguard of opposition 
to such extra-legal evidence. In practice, it was progressive defenders 
of social legislation who long sought to exclude proof regarding the 
alleged health and other benefits of legislation from judicial review. 
This Article offers an alternative reading of the origins of the Bran-
deis Brief and of its relation to the constitutional conflicts of the 
Lochner era. It argues that in marshalling the medical and social evi-
dence on the dangers of long work hours, progressives implicitly ca-
pitulated on the most divisive issue in nineteenth-century police power 
debates: the authority of courts to distinguish true public health 
measures from "mere pretext." 
This Article locates the origins of the scientific tradition on 
which the Brandeis Brief drew in early nineteenth-century British ef-
forts to frame labor laws as health interventions to overcome barriers 
to interference with market relations. In turn, this strategy led to the 
emergence, first in Britain and later in the United States, of a con-
servative claim equating common-law constitutionalism with the re-
quirement that courts be made guardians against laws passed under 
the false pretext of public health. It was in response to this line of ar-
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gument that American progressives, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, came to insist that courts owed legislators deference regard-
ing the existence of health justifications for legislation ranging from 
restrictions on the marketing of margarine to work-hour limits. 
Lochner's ultimate rejection of this presumption forced progressives 
to shoulder the burden of proof and gave rise to the Brandeis Brief 
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INTRODUCTION 
The "Brandeis Brief"1 story has long served a key role in the grand 
narrative on the rise and demise of legal formalism. The brief, largely 
social and medical in its argument, which the National Consumers 
League (NCL) submitted on behalf of the state of Oregon in Muller v. 
1. Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), reprinted in 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS ASSISTED BY JOSEPHINE GOLD MARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 1 (1969) [hereinafter 
Brandeis Brief]. The term "Brandeis Brief" is something of a misnomer. Rather than Brandeis, it was 
Josephine Goldmark, a senior staff member at the NCL as well as Louis Brandeis's sister-in-law, who 
was primarily responsible for the Muller brief. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of 
the Lawyer's Persona, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 239, 258 & n.69 (1999). Notwithstanding, this Article 
sticks to the familiar terminology, in keeping with practice of the various sources cited and analyzed. 
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Oregon,2 has become a symbol of daring legal strategy in ostensible defi-
ance of the formalist jurisprudence of the times. In the words of one ar-
ticle, "the brief was a brilliant break with the formalist tradition and had 
a significant impact on legal thought."3 Another author describes the 
brief as marking "a creative shift for the Court" that allowed for the in-
troduction and use of "vivid, factual detail as a way to break out of the 
formalist categories dominating the analysis."4 A third account speaks of 
the brief as a successful "gamble," a calculated risk taken in defiance of 
the "recognized style in devoting only two pages to the traditional legal 
arguments and citations."5 The implicit premise cutting across all three 
statements, and others like them, is the insulation of the legal process up 
to that point from the type of factual evidence brought by the NCL brief 
in Muller. In interjecting a body of evidence and a line of argument 
based in social and medical evidence rather than law, the Brandeis Brief 
radically challenged legal practice, or so has been the common belief. 
The success of the Brandeis Brief strategy in Muller and a number 
of subsequent decisions retrospectively reinforced the familiar concep-
tion of Lochner-era jurisprudence as formalist. In the words of Morton 
Horwitz, "the Brandeis Brief, by highlighting social and economic reality, 
suggested that the trouble with existing law was that it was out of touch 
with that reality."6 In this fashion, the success of the remedy the Bran-
deis Brief administered came to be taken as evidence of what was ailing 
the legal system to begin with. By implication, the judiciary's formalist 
insistence on abstract logic and strictly legal arguments was the obstacle 
preventing progressives from adopting the Brandeis Brief strategy earli-
er. 
Familiar as it has become, this storyline is difficult to reconcile with 
the historical evidence on two counts. The first is the incompatibility of 
the formalist thesis with the presence of extra-legal evidence in cases and 
briefs well predating Brandeis's. The portrayal of Lochner-era courts as 
preoccupied with abstract rules (to the exclusion of facts), and of the 
Brandeis Brief as an exceptional challenge to these formalist norms, is 
contradicted by the presence of references to encyclopedias, legislative 
reports, and medical textbooks both in judicial opinions and litigant 
briefs of the time.7 While the scope of the Brandeis Brief-as well as the 
ratio between legal and extra-legal material within it-may have been 
2. Muller, 208 U.S. at 423 (upholding an Oregon law limiting women's work in laundries to ten 
hours a day). 
3. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective 
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 106 (1993). 
4. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 88-89 (1987). 
5. PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 60--61 (1993). 
6. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870--1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 209 (1992). But see David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN 
BAG 2D 9, 11 (2011). 
7. See discussion infra Part LA. 
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unprecedented, the strategy as such was not. 
The second, and perhaps more fundamental challenge to the famil-
iar narrative, concerns the notion that the locus of opposition to the in-
troduction of scientific evidence into legal proceedings on social legisla-
tion was with conservative opponents of such legislation. In contrast to 
the prevailing account, it was not formalist conservative judges but pro-
gressive defenders of social legislation who long sought to exclude proof 
regarding the alleged health and other benefits of legislation from judi-
cial review. The progressive perspective on social legislation was that it 
was entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, independent of any 
scientific proof of underlying injury to health or any other predetermined 
rationale.8 According to this presumption, courts were not to second-
guess legislative facts. The exclusion of extra-legal evidence fit with that 
agenda, whereas it was inconsistent with the interests of conservatives 
who wanted to subordinate social and economic legislation to greater ju-
dicial oversight.9 The conventional historiography on the Brandeis Brief 
has thus seemingly gotten this story turned on its head. 
Once the reigning legal historical explanation for what .was wrong 
with the Lochner era, formalism is rapidly losing much of its earlier ex-
planatory power.10 As Brian Tamanaha has recently documented, to the 
extent that the formalist story paints the period in question as suffused 
with mechanistic and value-neutral models of the nature of legal reason-
ing, it is inconsistent with the historical record.U Repeated statements 
from judges and legal theorists dating to 1870-1920-ostensibly the hey-
day of the formalist consensus-describe adjudication as inherently dis-
cretionary and uncertain, rather than an abstract and deductive enter-
prise along the lines attributed to the formalist mindset. 12 Those whose 
words were invoked in the construction of the formalist story, as it turns 
out, were more than once quoted out of context or otherwise misinter-
pretedY Understandings of legal reasoning as a scientific and self-
contained enterprise, where these existed, were most often rooted in civ-
il-law institutions, rather than common-law reasoningY In similar fash-
ion, in a recent study of late nineteenth-century legal writers, David 
Rabban refutes the notion that legal thought during that era was preoc-
cupied with abstract conceptions, to the exclusion of history. 15 Finally, 
8. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
10. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 159-60, 176-77 (2010). 
11. /d. at 63. 
12. /d. at 18-21, 29-33. 
13. See, e.g., id. at 51-53. 
14. /d. at 24-26. 
15. DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2012). Earlier, James W. Ely, Jr., argued that rather than a 
"bastion of legal formalism," the Fuller Court "era witnessed a burst of creativity in both constitution-
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focusing on the Lochner decision itself, David Bernstein has recently 
highlighted the fact that much in contrast to its formalist reputation, Jus-
tice Peckham's opinion in the case "took explicit account of statistical da-
ta regarding the health of bakers."16 A fresh look at the Brandeis Brief's 
history can shed important light on the emergence and resilience of the 
formalist thesis, notwithstanding the above. 
The Lochner decision gave short shrift to the bakery law's proffered 
health rationale not because it approached the issue through deductive 
reasoning or abstract conceptions, but because, quite on the contrary, it 
assumed the task of evaluating for itself the pertinent legislative facts. 17 
In doing so, the Lochner Court rejected the longstanding progressive po-
sition that social legislation was entitled to judicial deference.18 In the 
wake of this loss, progressives reluctantly assumed the task of substanti-
ating the claimed health benefits of social legislation, most famously in 
the Brandeis Brief. If much of the above seems drastically out of step 
with long-held conceptions of the Brandeis Brief and its relation to the 
Lochner era, it is due to the degree to which the formalist narrative has 
become entrenched. Forgotten as a consequence was the fact that, at its 
inception, the Brandeis Brief emerged as a necessary adaptation rather 
than a model to celebrate. 
Similarly missing from the historical account, until now, are the 
British origins of the progressives' coupling of health justifications for la-
bor laws with the demand for deferential judicial review. As this Article 
discusses, health justifications for legislative measures limiting the work 
hours of women and children first date to early nineteenth-century Brit-
ain where the health argument served to fit labor laws within the narrow 
rationales for state intervention that free-market ideologies allowed.19 In 
Britain, parliamentary sovereignty precluded judicial scrutiny of the leg-
islation's purported public health rationales. In the United States, the 
doctrine of presumptive constitutionality served a similar, though gener-
ally unspoken, function. Lochner's rejection of this formula forced de-
fenders of social legislation to play by new and less advantageous rules.20 
Primary among them was a newfound necessity to substantiate the claim 
on the connection between limits on the workday and better health.21 
Formalism provided a useful, if inaccurate, explanation for why defend-
ers of social legislation did not adopt the Brandeis Brief strategy early 
a) and private law adjudication." JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. 
FuLLER, 1888-1910, at 73 (1995). 
16. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 23-24 (2011). 
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,59-62 (1905). 
18. !d. at 56-57. 
19. See discussion infra Part LA. 
20. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-57. 
. 21;, See id. at 57 ("The act must have a more direct relation ... before [it] can be held to be val-
td .... ). 
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on. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I locates the 
origins of the scientific tradition on which the Brandeis Brief drew in ear-
ly nineteenth-century British efforts to frame labor laws as health inter-
ventions in order to overcome political and constitutional barriers to in-
terference with market relations. This strategy is then tied to the 
emergence of a conservative, constitutional line of argument that ex-
pected courts to guard against legislation passed under false pretexts of 
public health. In Britain, this demand built on historical common-law 
principles associated with nuisance law.22 In the U.S., the requirement 
for judicial review of the facts offered in support of legislation was read 
into the Due Process Clause after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23 American progressives insisted in response that legisla-
tures were entitled to judicial deference regarding the existence of health 
justifications for social legislation, as Part II discusses.24 This division 
played out across policy domains ranging from the marketing of oleo-
margarine to work-hour limits. Part III tells the story of how Lochner's 
ultimate insistence on judicial scrutiny of legislative facts forced progres-
sives to shoulder the burden of proof and gave rise to the Brandeis Brief. 
Part IV next turns to the process through which this history receded from 
view, and the formalist explanation took hold. It focuses in this regard 
on the convergence between three sets of influences. The first were criti-
cisms leveled by progressive social scientists against the empirical blind-
ness of free market assumptions on freedom of contract.25 The second 
were the writings of Roscoe Pound during the decade leading to World 
War I, most importantly his call for "sociological jurisprudence" as an 
antidote to the judiciary's alleged insulation from social facts. 26 And the 
third was the NCL's own post hoc construction of the Brandeis Brief sto-
ryY The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the role that the ar-
gument from formalism came to play in progressive efforts to reconcile 
their longstanding objection to judicial review of economic legislation 
with their support for increased judicial protection for civil rights. 
22. See infra notes 68--69 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 98--104 and accompanying text. 
25. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
26. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607,611-13 (1907) 
[hereinafter Sociological Jurisprudence]. 
27. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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I. LABOR LAW AS PUBLIC HEALTH: BRITISH ORIGINS 
The oldest document the Brandeis Brief cited in support of the 
"Bad Effect of Long Hours on Health" was an 1833 compilation of Re-
ports of Medical Commissioners on the Health of Factory Operatives. 28 
Out of that report, the brief quoted the opinion of a Leeds surgeon who 
held that "males and females, whose work obliges them to stand con-
stantly, are more subject to varicose veins of the lower extremities, and 
to a larger and more dangerous extent, than ever I have witnessed even 
in foot soldiers."29 The testimony the Brandeis Brief invoked here was 
initially offered during parliamentary investigations held during the early 
1830s in response to rising demands for legislative limits on the work-
day.3o 
An understanding of the intellectual and political circumstances be-
hind the Brandeis Brief's line of argument must begin with early nine-
teenth-century Britain rather than early twentieth-century medical and 
social science. It was within that same British context that constitutional 
demands for judicial protection against what some deemed pretextual 
public health justifications for legislation first gained ground, as discussed 
below. 
A. Political Economy, Social Medicine, and Early British Labor 
Legislation 
During the 1830s and '40s, against growing political unrest at home 
and revolutionary fervor abroad, Parliament faced increasing pressure to 
moderate its free-market principles in the name of public health.31 The 
fight that ensued was partially semantic. At issue were diametrically op-
posed conceptions of the social objectives falling under the health um-
brella and, by implication, the scope of the state's attendant regulatory 
authority in this regard. On the one hand were narrow, medically based 
notions of public health as the prevention of physical injury and disease.32 
On the other were expansive understandings of the range of social and 
economic dislocations brought about as a result of industrialization, in-
cluding "hunger, public order, population and conditions of work ... as 
issues of health."33 Whether poverty, as such, could properly be con-
strued as a threat to health was the most important, and most divisive, 
question raised in this connection. The latter perspective, sometimes 
28. 5 FACfORlES INQUIRY COMMISSION, REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONERS, 1833, H.C. A-3 at 1 
(U.K.). 
29. !d. at 73. 
30. See, e.g., id.; see a/so CHRISTOPHER HAMLIN, PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE 
AGE OF CHADWICK 84-86 (1998). 
31. HAMLIN, supra note 30, at 84. 
32. !d. at 91-97. 
33. !d. at 52. 
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termed "social medicine," was advanced by reform-oriented physicians 
across Europe since the end of the eighteenth century.34 Within this 
framework, the prevention of disease and general improvements in nutri-
tion, housing, and quality of life, more broadly, were two sides of the 
same coin. From this followed radical implications with respect to the 
state's obligation, under its public health mandate, to ensure that all its 
citizens had sufficient access to the necessities of life.35 
Against this background, physician testimony regarding sources of 
injury to laborers, such as the 1833 statement the Brandeis Brief quoted, 
became a regular feature of parliamentary hearings on factory reform.36 
Physician activism along this model appears to have taken root during 
the 1780s, almost simultaneously with the crystallization of freedom-of-
contract principles in British political thought.37 In a 1784 report submit-
ted to the Manchester magistrates regarding the causes of a recent typhus 
epidemic, Dr. Thomas Percival, a renowned Manchester physician, and 
his colleagues listed "the injury done to young persons through confine-
ment, and too long continued labour" among the causes of the disease.38 
They went on to "earnestly recommend ... a longer recess from labour 
at noon, and a more early dismission from it in the evening, to all who 
work in the cotton mills."39 By the 1790s, Percival was actively calling for 
bringing factories under some mode of statutory inspection, in clear de-
parture from the prevailing laissez-faire sentiments of the time.40 Ulti-
mately, he helped influence the passage of the first parliamentary re-
strictions on the employment of children.41 
The regulation of children's work conditions had a greater chance of 
overcoming Parliament's aversion to paternalistic legislation though, as it 
was generally understood, the workday of children and adults could not 
34. GEORGE ROSEN, What Is Social Medicine?: A Genetic Analysis of the Concept, in FROM 
MEDICAL POLICE TO SOCIAL MEDICINE: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE 60, 61-71 
(1974). In a speech he delivered in 1790 the renowned Prussian physician Johann Peter Frank warned 
that public health legislation would prove useless unless it addressed "the richest source of diseases, 
the extreme misery of the people." Johann Peter Frank, Academic Address on the People's Misery: 
Mother of Diseases (Henry E. Sigerist trans., May 5, 1790), reprinted in 9 BULL. HIST. MED. 88, 90 
(1941). Consequently, he advocated both the abolition of serfdom and price controls on vital com-
modities as public health measures. /d. at 90-99. 
35. The view of health as a right of citizenship spread throughout Europe in the wake of the 
French Revolution. See DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 97-110 (1999). Likening poverty to a "slow poi-
son" one French writer called on the state to address problems of malnutrition, infant mortality, and 
dangerous occupations. M. MOHEAU, RECHERCHES ET CONSIDERATIONS SUR LA POPULATION DE LA 
FRANCE 217 (Paris. Moulton 1778). 
36. See HAMLIN, supra note 30, at 97-99. 
37. See ERIC J. EVANS, THE FORGING OF THE MODERN STATE: EARLY INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN 
1783-1870, at 47-56 (2001 ). 
38. J.K. Howard, Dr. Thomas Percival and the Beginnings of Industrial Legislation, 25 J. Soc. 
OCCUPATIONALMED. 58,60 (1975) (citing Wheeler's Manchester Chronicle, Oct.16, 1784). 
39. /d. at 61. 
40. /d. at 62. 
41. /d. at 63. 
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realistically be separated. Even with respect to children, however, proof 
that existing conditions constituted a health hazard was required for the 
passage of legislation. For this reason, physician testimony played an 
important role in the parliamentary investigations that preceded the pas-
sage of the 1819 Factory Act.42 Some of the physicians who appeared in 
this context linked work in factories to a long list of symptoms and dis-
eases ranging from paleness and loss of appetite to stunted growth, struc-
tural deformities, glandular swelling, dyspepsia, scrofula (a form of tu-
berculosis), and varicose veins.43 The list evokes the symptoms and 
diseases the Brandeis Brief associated with long work hours among 
women.44 
In addition to children, the dangers that long work hours posed to 
women was a recurrent theme during early parliamentary investigations. 
As early as the 1818 Lords' inquiry, we find medical testimony attrib-
uting difficulties in child birth to curvature of the spine brought about 
through factory work.45 As one witness said: "Throughout I have di-
rected my remarks to the condition of the male sex employed in facto-
ries; to the female sex, however, their application is still more forcible."46 
In 1844, Parliament limited women's hours to twelve per day (same as 
the hours of children between the ages of thirteen and eighteen).47 Pro-
tective legislation directed at women, similar to that aimed at children, 
could be justified under freedom-of-contract principles, both because of 
the purported vulnerability of women, and because they were not seen as 
free agents possessing the requisite freedom to contract in the first 
place.48 These "[p ]atriarchal values," as Robert Gray has written, "pro-
42. Cotton Mills and Factories Act, 1819, 59 Geo. 3 c.66 (Eng.). The Act prohibited the em· 
ployment of children younger than nine and limited children under age sixteen to sixteen hours of 
work per day, though the law was essentially unenforced. See Early Factory Legislation, 
PARLIAMENT. UK, http://www.parliament. uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/livingleaming/ 
19thcentury/overview/earlyfactorylegislation/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
43. COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL MEN AND OTHERS IN 
1816, H. C. (U.K.), reprinted in CHARLES WING, EVILS OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM: DEMONSTRATED BY 
PARLIAMENTARY EVIDENCE, at cix, cix-xlxv (1967). 
44. See, e.g., Brandeis Brief, supra note 1, at 29 (citing MASS. BUREAU STAT. LAB., DOMESTIC 
LABOR AND WOMEN'S WORK (1872)) ("In the cotton mills at Fitchburg the women and children are 
pale, crooked, and sickly-looking. The women appear dispirited, and the children without the bloom 
of childhood in their cheeks, or the elasticity that belongs to that age."); see also id. (citing REPORT OF 
THE BRITISH CHIEF INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS (1873)) ("The house surgeon of a 
large hospital has stated that every year he had a large number of cases of pulmonary disease in girls, 
the origin of which he could distinctly trace to long and late hours in overcrowded and unhealthy 
workrooms."). 
45. The Factory System, 57 Q. REv. 396,406-07 (1836). 
46. /d. at 407. 
47. Marianna Valverde, "Giving the Female a Domestic Turn": The Social, Legal and Moral 
Regulation of Women's Work in British Cotton Mills, 1920-1850, 21 J. Soc. HIST. 619,627 (1988). 
48. As Leonard Homer, a factory inspector and one of the leaders of the campaign for factory 
reform put it, "Twelve hours' daily work is more than enough for anyone; but however desirable it 
might be that excessive working should be prevented, there are great difficulties in the way of legisla-
tive interference with the labour of adult men. The case, however, is very different as respects women; 
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vided some space for cross-class negotiation and the construction of con-
sensus, including a settlement of the factory question, around the middle 
of the century."49 
But the medical profession was not united in this regard, as some 
physicians disputed the existence of evidence showing a direct cause-and-
effect relationship between the length of the work day and particular dis-
eases. 50 This was notable in the course of an 1818 House of Lords inves-
tigation into a bill limiting the daily hours of labor for all persons under 
the age of sixteen to eleven hours.51 The Lords' committee heard from 
thirty-four medical men, physicians and surgeons, out of a total of 150 
witnesses.52 Of these, approximately half offered unequivocal support on 
the dangers children suffered as a consequence of factory employment.53 
For the most part, they focused on the general link between factory em-
ployment and various "factory diseases," such as those mentioned 
above.54 But, in addition, some spoke directly to the matter at hand and 
put their expertise behind the call for shortening the workday.55 Physi-
cians who testified in opposition to such measures, on the other hand, 
took the view that one "could not ... form any idea of the number of 
hours a child of eight years ought to be employed in a factory."56 The 
medical profession was similarly divided when Parliament again took up 
the question in 1832-33.57 Medical men who argued on the side of legis-
lation relied on common sense understandings of the injury inflicted by 
long work hours.58 Skeptics demanded more concrete medical evidence 
on the contribution of long hours to disease or other injuries.59 The ca-
pacity of medical science to answer this question remained in sharp dis-
pute.60 
The physicians who stepped up to the task of providing factory leg-
islation with the necessary medical imprimatur were importantly aided 
by the fact that medical theory during the early half of the nineteenth 
century did not itself clearly distinguish between the socioeconomic and 
for not only are they much less free agents, but they are physically more incapable .... " /d. 
49. Robert Gray, Medical Men, Industrial Labor and the State in Britain, 1830-50, 16 Soc. HIST. 
19, 37 (1991 ). 
50. /d. at 24, 28. 
51. The Factory System, supra note 45, at 403. 
52. !d. at 403--04. 
53. See id. at 404. 
54. Gray, supra note 49, at 21. 
55. In response to the question, "Are you of an opinion that working thirteen hours and a half in 
a factory is likely to exhaust young persons?" one physician answered, "I am astonished for my own 
part that we do not hear of instances of their dropping down dead while at work." The Factory Sys-
tem, supra note 45, at 407. 
56. /d. at 405. 
57. Gray, supra note 49, at 24-25. 
58. Jd.at27. 
59. See id. at 26. 
60. /d. at 35. 
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medical causes of disease. In the words of Christopher Hamlin, "just as 
the social issues of the day were significantly medical, so medical theory 
was significantly social, more alert to social causes of disease than any we 
have had since. "61 As Hamlin goes on to explain, medical theories 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century distinguished between 
two categories of causes, "proximate" and "remote," and poverty was 
implicated in both.62 Where immediate causes were concerned, a promi-
nent theory blamed epidemic diseases, such as cholera or typhus, on 
"miasmas" or bad air that emanated from decaying matter, contaminated 
water, and other sources of filth. 63 Within this framework, the deficient 
sanitary conditions characteristic of the private dwellings and neighbor-
hoods of the poor were considered a direct threat to public health. As to 
the remote causes, these included "predisposing causes" with the capaci-
ty to increase the susceptibility of individuals to disease.64 Poor nutrition, 
exposure to cold, impure air, and overwork were among the most fre-
quently cited predisposing causes.65 
B. Public Health, Legislative Prerogative, and Common Law 
Health became the requisite criteria for passing early labor legisla-
tion because it remained, even in the eyes of some liberal economists, a 
viable justification for legislative interference with the market. 66 Scien-
tific facts about health seemed to do what straight appeals to socioeco-
nomic justice could not. Within this context, medicine came to serve, 
quoting Hamlin once again, as "the fuel of authority," fanning "the 
flames of factory reform. "67 
Conservative opponents insisted in response that, used in this fash-
61. HAMLIN,supra note 30, at 52. 
62. /d. at 55-57. 
63. /d. at 60-61. 
64. /d. at 55-60. 
65. ld. at 57, 62. 
66. See Gray, supra note 49, at 35 ("Speaking about social issues as a medical man positioned the 
speaker as interpreter of natural laws, often with moral and providential overtones, distinct from, but 
impinging upon the economic realm."). 
67. HAMLIN, supra note 30, at 37. In lending their prestige to the cause of social reform, British 
doctors fit within similar patterns of medical activism elsewhere in Europe. William Coleman pro-
vides a detailed account of the work of "French sociomedical investigators" during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and their contribution to "popular recognition of the disproportionate risks and 
inordinate suffering faced by the worker and his family." WILLIAM COLEMAN, DEATH IS A SOCIAL 
DISEASE: PUBLIC HEALTH AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN EARLY INDUSTRIAL FRANCE 278 (1982). 
Similarly, against the backdrop of the 1848 revolutions, the German pathologist Rudolf Virchow con-
cluded his report on the causes of a typhus epidemic in the impoverished district of Upper Silesia with 
detailed prescriptions on the radical political measures necessary to bring about social transformation 
in the region. These included education, agricultural and industrial development, and, most im-
portantly, the protection of workers from exploitation and long hours. RUDOLF VIRCHOW, Report on 
the Typhus Epidemic in Upper Silesia, in 1 COLLECTED ESSAYS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 205,318-19 (L.J. Rather ed., 1985). The need for limits on the length of the workday 
followed in turn. 
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ion, the term "health" was merely a pretext for radical interference with 
property rights. First in Britain,68 and later in the United States, they 
likewise invoked common-law principles to argue that the state bore the 
burden of proof on the existence of legitimate public health justifications 
for social legislation, and that the courts ought to arbitrate that question 
through the adjudication of nuisance claims.69 Where the British and 
American variants of this argument substantially differed, however, was 
with respect to the implications for judicial review of legislation. In Brit-
ain, the argument from common law was directed at Parliament and, 
more broadly, at public opinion/0 By contrast, in the United States, simi-
lar common-law-based notions of constitutional limitations transformed, 
subsequent to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, into the 
claim that the Due Process Clause conferred on courts authority to inval-
idate state legislation passed under pretense of public health.71 
The core premise underpinning the distinction between pretextual 
and sincere public health rationales for legislation was the existence of 
limits on the proper objectives of legislation. This is because, absent such 
limits, reformers would have been free to bypass any and all health justi-
fications in favor of explicit labor or social rationales. In other words, in 
looking to the judiciary to root out legislative pretense regarding health, 
conservative jurists in Britain and the United States a priori presumed 
the existence of substantive constitutional limits restricting social legisla-
tion to conventional health and safety rationales.72 For advocates of so-
cial legislation, both in Britain and the United States, fluid formulations 
of the requisite health and safety rationales offered an alternative to di-
rect confrontation over the constitutionality of labor legislation as such. 
Hence, work-hour laws came to be promoted as health laws, as discussed 
before.73 The viability of this de facto political compromise depended, 
however, on legislative prerogative regarding the boundaries of public 
health, a condition that British parliamentary sovereignty well satisfied.74 
68. See Noga Morag-Levine, Common Law, Civil Law and the Administrative State: From Coke 
to Lochner, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 601, 636 (2007) [hereinafter From Coke to Lochner); see also Noga 
Morag-Levine, Is Precautionary Regulation a Civil Law Instrument? Lessons from the History of the 
Alkali Act, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 21-22 (2011) [hereinafter Precautionary Regulation]. 
69. See Precautionary Regulation, supra note 68, at 21-22. 
70. Toulmin Smith, a barrister who led the call for local self government, and attendant nui-
sance-based limits on public health regulation in Britain during the 1840s and 1850s, explicitly rejected 
the U.S. model of constitutional review as inapplicable to Britain. J. TOULMIN SMITH, LOCAL SELF-
GovERNMENT AND CENTRALIZATION: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH; AND ITS PRACTICAL 
TENDENCIES, AS AFFECTING SOCIAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL WELFARE AND PROGRESS 126-27 
(1851). 
71. See From Coke to Lochner, supra note 68, at 641-42 (discussing parallels between conserva-
tive British ideas regarding common-law limits on public health regulation and Cooley's constitutional 
doctrines subsequent to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
72. /d. 
73. See supra Part I.A. 
74. On parliamentary sovereignty in Britain of the nineteenth century. see JEFFREY 
GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 221-28 (1999). 
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Thus, whereas parliamentary investigations considered the link between 
long hours and injury to health at great length, the validity of any subse-
quent legislation was entirely independent of the persuasiveness of the 
evidence.75 The situation was far different, however, in the United States 
where legislation faced a direct threat from judicial review, and where 
conservatives called on judges to scrutinize the purported health benefits 
of legislative interferences with the laissez-faire principle.76 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH, PRETEXT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Following Britain, early U.S. work-hour laws similarly focused on 
children and women. 77 And, again in keeping with the British precedent, 
these legislative efforts found support in medical arguments regarding 
the danger faced as a consequence of long work days.78 In the absence of 
parliamentary sovereignty, progressives invoked a presumption of consti-
tutionality in search of de facto immunity from judicial review.79 Under 
this formula, all that was necessary to insulate legislation from the courts 
was for the legislature to justify its action in reference to well accepted 
substantive ends such as health, safety, or public welfare.80 The decision 
on what these three terms meant in practice, and what means might best 
serve their purpose, would be left entirely to the legislature. Not surpris-
ingly, as discussed below, conservatives advanced a radically different 
understanding of the judiciary's responsibility. Under this view, the dan-
ger that legislatures would abuse their power required rigorous judicial 
scrutiny of purported justifications for legislation. U.S. courts wavered 
between these perspectives during the final three decades of the nine-
teenth century across a diverse array of regulatory controversies. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first encountered the claim that the Four-
teenth Amendment conferred on courts the authority to invalidate state 
laws when passed under the pretext of public health in the Slaughter-
house Cases. 81 But the majority of the Justices refused to second-guess 
75. See William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of Labor Politics in the United States and Eng-
land, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 201, 203 (Christopher L. Tom-
lins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992). 
76. See id. at 201, 203 (discussing the larger impact of U.S. constitutional doctrines of judicial 
supremacy on the U.S. labor movement and its divergence from its British counterpart). 
77. See MARION COTTER CAHILL, SHORTER HOURS: A STUDY OF THE MOVEMENT SINCE THE 
CIVIL WAR 108-16 (1932). 
78. See discussion infra (discussing Ritchie's, Holden's, and Lochner's review of public health 
justifications for legislative limits on the workday). 
79. Brandeis Brief, supra note 1, at 9--10. 
80. See id. 
81. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Slaughterhouse concerned an 1869 Louisiana statute that cen-
tralized and otherwise regulated slaughtering in New Orleans. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiffs challenged the state's claim that the law was enacted as a sanitary measure and instead allud-
ed to "legislative caprice, partiality, ignorance or corruption." Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Slaughterhouse 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535,537 (Philip B. Kurland & Ger-
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the evidence behind the relevant legislative policies. Writing in dissent, 
Justice Field insisted that courts had a duty to root out legislation passed 
"under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation."82 His opinion, 
through a list of subsequent cases, remained a minority view on the 
Court. The high-water mark of judicial deference to legislative facts was 
likely reached in 1877 with Chief Justice Waite's words in Munn v. Illi-
nois: "For our purposes we must assume that, if a state of facts could ex-
ist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute 
now under consideration was passed."83 
By the 1880s, however, the judiciary's earlier deference to legisla-
tive facts showed signs of erosion, first at the state level, and later in the 
Supreme Court. An important arena on which this controversy played 
out was litigation over the constitutionality of legislation limiting the 
manufacturing or sale of oleomargarine, a butter substitute made of beef 
fat churned with milk.84 While oleomargarine was a topic of political sig-
nificance in its own right, the implications for the judiciary's role in the 
review of labor laws were an implicit subtext. 
A. Litigation over Oleomargarine Regulation 
Pressure from the U.S. dairy industry propelled at least thirty-four 
states or territories to enact legislation by 1886 requiring that oleomarga-
rine be clearly labeled so as to avoid its confusion with butter.85 More 
drastically, nine states passed laws that outright banned the manufacture 
and/or sale of oleomargarine.86 The oleomargarine industry quickly chal-
lenged the constitutionality of these bans, and between 1882 and 1887, 
the high courts of three states, Missouri,87 New York88 and Pennsylvania,89 
ruled on the issue. Whereas the Missouri and Pennsylvania courts up-
held the bans, the New York Court of Appeals did not.90 The relevance, 
and, hence, the admissibility of testimony pertaining to the safety of ole-
omargarine was the most important bone of contention.91 
In all three of the above cases, the defendants were prosecuted for 
the sale of oleomargarine in violation of the ban, and each of these de-
fendants offered to present expert testimony regarding the wholesome-
hard Casper eds., 1975). 
82. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 87 (Field, J., dissenting). 
83. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1877). 
84. Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter 
and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 101....()2 (1989); see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 
(1904). 
85. Miller, supra note 84, at 109. 
86. Id. at 113-14. 
87. State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110,117-18 (1882). 
88. People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29, 33-34 (N.Y. 1885). 
89. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 60 A. 554, 554 (Pa. 1905). 
90. Compare id., and Addington, 77 Mo. at 117-18, with Marx, 2 N.E. at 33-34. 
91. See, e.g., Marx, 2 N.E. at 30-31. 
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ness of the product they sold.92 The trial courts in all three states refused 
this testimony on grounds of irrelevance, a decision with which, of the 
three, only the New York Court of Appeals disagreed.93 Hidden within 
the seemingly technical division over the admissibility of the contested 
evidence were fundamentally divergent conceptions regarding the limits 
of the state's regulatory authority and the judiciary's related oversight 
function. Implicit in the offer of evidence regarding the wholesomeness 
of oleomargarine was an assumption that a statute banning the market-
ing of a harmless product would be unconstitutional.94 To the extent that 
the defendant was able to show that the law lacked a health based or 
otherwise legitimate justification, the law's invalidity would be estab-
lished.95 Judges who refused this evidence rejected that underlying as-
sumption. The Missouri Supreme Court was explicit as to this point: 
"[t)he legislature may do many things in the legitimate exercise of [the 
police] and other powers, which, however unwise or injudicious they may 
be, are not obnoxious to the objection of being beyond the scope of legis-
lative authority."96 Judicial scrutiny of the underlying justifications for 
legislation threatened to bring the emergent administrative state to a 
standstill, as the Missouri court explained: 
Such a position, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would utterly 
overthrow the exercise of the police power by the State; overthrow 
every law the wisdom of which could not bear the test of scrutiny. 
Proceeding on such a theory, a man arrested for killing game at an 
unlawful season, might appropriately offer to prove that the birds 
killed were injurious to the public or were destructive to crops. Or, 
made to submit to sanitary regulations, might claim that there was 
no disease on board his ship, and, therefore, the law which com-
pelled him to remain at quarantine, was an arbitrary infringement 
of his constitutional rights.97 
Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals emphatically 
disagreed when it invalidated an 1884 New York statute that prohibited 
the manufacture of any article not from milk or cream "designed to take 
the place of butter or cheese."98 In reaching this decision, the New York 
court cited the testimony of "distinguished chemists that oleomargarine 
was composed of the same elements as dairy butter. "99 The testimony 
was initially presented at the trial but was stricken from the record on the 
motion of the district attorney, in keeping with the earlier practice of the 
92. See Andrews, 60 A. at 554; Marx, 2 N.E. at 30; Addington, 77 Mo. at 111. 
93. See Andrews, 60 A. at 554; Marx, 2 N.E. at 30; Addington, 77 Mo. at 111. 
94. See, e.g., Addington, 70Mo. at 117. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. 
97. /d. 
98. Marx, 2 N.E. at 29. 
99. /d. at 30. 
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Missouri courts.100 But unlike in Missouri, the New York Court of Ap-
peals reversed the lower court on this ground, and considered the previ-
ously excluded evidence when it concluded that the dairy industry's na-
ked interest in driving out competition for milk substitutes was behind 
the law.101 In reviewing the evidence underlying the New York legisla-
ture's health rationale for the oleomargarine ban, the New York Court of 
Appeals forced into the open the core issue: the constitutionality of a law 
that was enacted solely so as to serve the economic interests of one in-
dustry at the expense of another. 102 Cornered into this framing of the is-
sue, the district attorney took the position that the law would not be "be-
yond the power of the legislature" "even if it were certain that the sole 
object of the enactment was to protect the dairy industry in this state 
against the substitution of a cheaper article made from cheaper materi-
als."103 The answer was arguably consistent with the Supreme Court's 
language in Munn that the proper remedy for legislative abuses was 
democratic, rather than judicial,ul4 but this was a controversial and risky 
line of argument. 
With state courts sharply divided in this fashion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court took up the constitutionality of legislative bans on milk substitutes 
in Powell v. Pennsylvania. The issue arrived before the Court as an ap-
peal from a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which left 
standing a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, af-
ter it refused, on grounds of irrelevance, to allow testimony on the safety 
of oleomargarine along the exact lines on which the Missouri court re-
lied.105 Writing for the majority of the Justices on the Court, Justice Har-
lan upheld Pennsylvania's oleomargarine law. Notably his starting point, 
similar to that of the New York Court of Appeals in Marx, was that "the. 
privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, hold-
ing, and selling property, is an essential part of [the] rights of liberty and 
property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the 
Pennsylvania law would unconstitutionally infringe on this privilege in 
the event that it lacked "real or substantial relation" to the protection of 
"public health."106 The difference in result followed from the two courts' 
divergence over the degree of judicial scrutiny to be given to legislative 
findings as to the existence of such "real or substantial relation."107 
100. ld. 
101. !d. at 32. 
102. !d. at 32-33. 
103. ld. 
104. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132-33 (1876). In similar fashion, Justice Harlan stated in 
Powell, "in many cases of mere administration, the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying 
except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment .... " Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685-
86 (1888) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886)). 
105. Powell, 127 U.S. at 681-82. 
106. See id. at 684. 
107. ld. 
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The Supreme Court revisited the oleomargarine question a decade 
later in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, a Commerce Clause challenge to 
the Pennsylvania statute left standing in PowellYJ8 The success of this 
challenge depended, in part, on whether unadulterated oleomargarine 
was safe to consume and, as such, a legitimate article of interstate com-
merce (a corollary to whether oleomargarine posed a risk to health suffi-
cient to justify regulation under the police power).109 This time around, 
the Court, with Justices Gray and Harlan dissenting, voided the law."0 
The opinion's author was Justice Peckham, who cited both the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica and a report by the Commissioner of Agriculture in 
support of the conclusion that unadulterated oleomargarine was indeed 
safe to consume.111 Contrary to the conventional narrative, Peckham, 
who would shortly go on to author the Lochner decision, was an "early 
adopter" of the category of extra-legal materials generally associated 
with the Brandeis Brief. 
B. A Court Not "Bound by Mere Forms": The Court Hints at the Limits 
of Deference 
A comparison between Justice Harlan's opinion in Powell and Chief 
Justice Waite's in Munn, a little over a decade earlier, already suggests a 
subtle shift in the Court's conception of its oversight role. Most im-
portant here is the difference between the two opinions' answer to the 
theoretical threat of legislative abuse of power. Whereas Munn left the 
solution entirely up to democratic processes, Powell recognized an au-
thority, indeed an obligation on the part of courts, to overturn legislation 
that was "plainly forbidden by the Constitution."112 But because this 
power "is always one of extreme delicacy," as Harlan explained, courts 
must reserve invalidating legislation to instances of "clear or palpable" 
constitutional violation.113 
As an example of the type of legislation justifying such intervention, 
Justice Harlan offered legislation passed "under the pretence of guarding 
the public health, the public morals, or the public safety."114 At the same 
time, the requirement that laws be unconstitutional on their face before 
they could be invalidated by the courts implied, in turn, that in reaching 
any such conclusion, courts could only take into account commonly 
known facts of which they are required to take "judicial cognizance."115 
108. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1898). 
109. Jd. at 6-7. 
110. I d. at 25. 
111. I d. at 9-10. 
112. Powell, 127 U.S. at 686. 
113. Id. 
114. I d. at 686-87. 
115. I d. at 685. 
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Most emphatically, Justice Harlan argued at the time, "[i]t is not a part of 
[courts'] functions to conduct investigations of facts entering into ques-
tions of public policy."116 What this meant was that whereas the authority 
of courts to invalidate legislation passed under the pretense of public 
health existed in principle, the evidentiary barriers blocking such an 
eventuality almost precluded it in practice. A year earlier, Justice Harlan 
confronted the same set of issues in Mugler v. Kansas, 117 where he wrote 
an opinion upholding a statute banning the manufacture and sale of in-
toxicating liquor. 118 His language there seemed to impart to the judiciary 
a somewhat less deferential stance: 
The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled 
by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn 
duty- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon 
the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its 
authority.119 
Neither in Powell, nor in Mugler, did Harlan indicate the circum-
stances under which he would be inclined to conclude that the legislature 
had indeed exceeded its authority. But the fact that the highly contro-
versial statutes in both cases did not rise to that standard made it clear 
that any such circumstances would be both extreme and rare. Notwith-
standing, Harlan's language in both opinions hints at an impending 
change. This is perhaps most evident in his notice that courts are not 
"bound by mere forms" and would not shy, where necessary, from un-
dertaking inquiry into "the substance of things."120 The juxtaposition of 
such judicial inquiry with form-bound legal reasoning anticipates realist 
critiques of legal formalism. Under the influence of the realists, current 
observers have become accustomed to equating formalism with judicial 
insulation from social facts. 121 By contrast, in the context within which 
Justice Harlan made the comment above, a willingness to uphold legisla-
tion under an unwavering presumption of constitutionality, irrespective 
of facts, is what critics thought of as a court "bound by mere forms."122 
Justice Fields quoted Harlan's language in Mugler on the Court's 
116. !d. Regarding the defendant's failed attempt to provide the trial court with facts speaking to 
the safety of oleomargarine (and hence the absence of a health rationale for the law), Justice Harlan 
invoked the rather technical claim that: 
[T]he offer in the court below was to show by proof that the particular articles the defendant sold, 
and those in his possession for sale, in violation of the statute, were, in fact, wholesome or nutri-
tious articles of food. It is entirely consistent with that offer that many, indeed, that most kinds of 
oleomargarine butter in the market contain ingredients that are or may become injurious to 
health. 
!d. at 684. 
117. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
118. !d. at 675. 
119. !d. at 661. 
120. !d. 
121. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL LEGAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 20 (1995). 
122. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. 
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not being bound by "mere forms" in his own dissent in Powe/!. 123 Nota-
bly, he did so immediately after he offered the New York Court of Ap-
peals decisions in Marx and, more importantly, in In re Jacobs as models 
for emulation.124 In the latter decision, the New York Court of Appeals 
invalidated a union-backed law that prohibited the manufacture of cigars 
in tenement-houses in the absence of sufficient evidence justifying the 
legislation's purported health rationale. 125 In injecting In re Jacobs into 
the discussion, Justice Field made explicit the otherwise unspoken politi-
cal subtext of both the Mugler and the Powell decisions: the constitution-
al status of labor legislation.126 
C. Evolving Strategies in the Defense of Labor Laws 
The mid 1880s in the United States were a time of unprecedented 
conflict between labor and capital, prompted in part by declining wages 
in the wake of widespread economic depression. 127 Workers' demand for 
an eight-hour day galvanized strikes and demonstrations across the coun-
try with, at times, violent consequences.128 In its refusal to defer to the 
legislature's declaration that the cigar law was "intended for the im-
provement of the public health," and its insistence that it was up to it to 
"determine the fact declared and enforce the supreme law,"129 a New 
York court forced defenders of labor legislation to rethink key aspects of 
their political and legal strategies.U0 
The legal transformation is made evidently clear through a compari-
son between the arguments put forth in defense of the cigar law in In re 
Jacobs, and the brief that the State of Illinois submitted a decade later to 
that state's supreme court in Ritchie v. People. 131 In an effort to provide a 
health justification for a law forbidding cigar manufacturing in tene-
123. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,697 (1888) (Fields, J., dissenting) (quoting Mugler, 123 
U.S. at 661). 
124. /d. at 692. 
125. In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112-15 (1885). 
126. See, e.g., Powell, 127 U.S. at 692, 695-96 (Fields, J., dissenting). 
127. Davis Rich Dewey, National Problems: 1885-1897, in 24 THE AMERICAN NATION: A 
HISTORY 3, 40-56 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1907). 
128. See id. (describing rise of organized labor out of reactions to poor working conditions and 
low pay); see generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY (1984) (discussing a pivotal mo-
ment in the labor movement). 
129. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. at 110. 
130. See FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION 230-40 (1905) (dis-
cussing the impact of the Jacobs decision on efforts to regulate tenement manufacturing); WILLIAM E. 
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 40,42 (1991) (discussing 
the Jacobs decision as a "landmark" in the "political evolution" of Samuel Gompers, a labor move-
ment leader who served as vice president of the Cigar Makers International Union at the time of the 
decision, away from reliance on legislation towards an emphasis on the use of economic power, via 
"strikes and agitation"). 
131. Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error, Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895), availa-
ble at http://florencekelley.northwestern.edullegal/court. 
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ments, the Cigar-Makers International Union (CMIU) argued before the 
New York legislature that home workers sick with tuberculosis were lia-
ble to spread the disease to smokers who consumed tenement-rolled to-
bacco.132 Notably, however, this argument failed to make its way into the 
briefs defending the law before the New York state courts. Rather than 
put forth a vulnerable scientific theory, the law's defenders bet on judi-
cial deference. The Jacobs court defied this expectation, changing the 
rules of the game. 
Labor's stinging defeat in Jacobs was likely before the eyes of the Il-
linois progressives in charge of mounting the state's defense in Ritchie. 
The Illinois law at issue in Ritchie limited women's employment in facto-
ries to eight hours a day, or forty-eight hours a week, and was passed 
through the efforts of Progressive reformers, among them Florence Kel-
ley, who was subsequently put in charge of enforcing the legislation when 
she was appointed as Illinois's First Chief Factory Inspector.133 Later on, 
Kelley, who at that time was a student at Northwestern University Law 
School, took part in developing the legal strategy deployed in defense of 
the legislation.134 
Rather than cast its lot entirely on the demand for judicial defer-
ence, the Ritchie brief hedged its bets by coupling insistence that the law 
was properly entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, with the 
presentation of evidence supportive of the health benefits associated 
with reduced work hours for women. 135 Much like the far more famous 
brief in Muller, Illinois's Ritchie brief included citations to medical and 
other sources suggestive of the particular susceptibility of women to inju-
132. ALAN M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GERMS, GENES, AND THE "IMMIGRANT MENACE" 
180 (1994). Concerns about germ dispersal were not the actual drive behind the push for legislative 
restrictions on tenement manufacturing. Two sets of actors coalesced behind the New York legisla-
ture's enactment in 1884 of the prohibition on home manufacturing of cigars which the Jacobs court 
struck down. The first was the Cigar-Makers International Union (CMIU), whose members worked in 
cigar factories. /d. Relations between this Union and tenement cigar workers had been strained since 
1877 when CMIU blamed the tenement workers for the failure of a strike that year. /d. Soon thereaf-
ter, the Union began to lobby the legislature to abandon tenement manufacturing with the objective of 
improving working conditions in cigar-making factories. They were joined by progressive reformers 
who objected to the rampant employment of children in tenement manufacturing. EILEEN BORIS, 
HOME TO WORK: MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK IN THE UNITED 
STATES 32-39 (1994); Felice Batlan, A Reevaluation of the New York Court of Appeals: The Home, the 
Market, and Labor, 1885-1905,27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 489,516 (2002). 
133. KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK: THE RISE OF 
WOMEN'S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-l900,at 237,254 (1995). 
134. /d. at 248. 
135. At the same time, somewhat inconsistently, the same brief argued for the inadmissibility of 
evidence that challengers of the law might have wanted to present that a "particular occupation did 
not need regulating, or that the defendant was carrying on his business in such manner as to render it 
nearly or wholly innocuous." Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error, supra note 131, at 28. The 
reason offered was that "[i]t would be impracticable to admit proof in such cases" and that "if this 
were admitted the enforcement of a general police regulation by a state or city would be practically 
impossible." /d. 
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ries associated with long hoursY6 
Notwithstanding, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the law as 
unconstitutional class legislation after finding that 
[t]here is no reasonable ground-at least none which has been 
made manifest to us in the arguments of counsel- for fixing upon 
eight hours in one day as the limit within which woman can work 
without injury to her physique, and beyond which, if she work, inju-
ry will necessarily follow. 137 
The State, in other words, bore the burden of proof on the justifications 
behind the specific eight hour limit, a burden which, notwithstanding the 
inclusion of medical evidence, the Illinois brief failed to meet. Nowhere, 
however, did this court's otherwise unsympathetic justices question the 
Ritchie brief's reliance on extra-legal evidence, a challenge the formalist 
thesis would lead us to expect. 
Rather than the judges, it was the brief's authors who harbored am-
bivalence on this issue. Concerned that their extra-legal brief would be 
taken as a concession on the all-important matter of the presumption of 
constitutionality to which social legislation was entitled, they offered this 
revealing disclaimer: 
[A]lthough we have shown that such labor is particularly prejudicial 
to health, and therefore particularly subject to the restraining influ-
ence of the state under its police power, it has not been necessary 
for us to do so. 
The question whether or not the particular employment regu-
lated by the law is unhealthful or dangerous will not be inquired in-
to by the courts; the law being, upon its face, an exercise of the po-
lice power, the exclusive right to determine whether it is an 
employment which needs regulating must be left with the legisla-
ture.138 
While state courts grappled, inconsistently, with the constitutionality of 
work-hour restrictions throughout the 1880s and the early 1890s, the Su-
preme Court remained above the fray. The Court upheld the presump-
tion of constitutionality across a list of challenges to economic and social 
legislation but none of these touched on the explosive topic of work-hour 
restrictions. At long last, that issue reached the Court in Holden v. Har-
dy, an appeal of the Utah Supreme Court decision that upheld work-
hour limits for miners and smelters.139 In an opinion signed by seven Jus-
tices, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, finding the law to be "a valid exercise of the police power of the 
136. See Felice Batlan, Notes from the Margins: Florence Kelley and the Making of Sociological 
Jurisprudence, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND 
METHODS 239, 245 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010). 
137. Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 459 (Ill. 1895). 
138. Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error, supra note 131, at 26. 
139. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
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state."140 Writing for the majority, Justice Brown quoted the Court's 
opinion in Lawton v. Steele for the proposition that "a large discretion 'is 
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what the inter-
ests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the pro-
tection of such interests."' 141 At the same time, he stopped well short of 
any broad pronouncements regarding the law's presumptive constitu-
tionality. Instead, his opinion upheld the law on the relatively narrow 
ground pertaining to the particular dangers inherent to work in mines or 
smelters.142 "These employments, when too long pursued," Justice 
Brown wrote, "the legislature has judged to be detrimental to the health 
of the employes, and, so long as there are reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that this is so, its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the 
Federal courts. "143 The existence of such reasonable grounds was, how-
ever, contingent on whether "such determination is supported by the 
facts." 144 
Notwithstanding the Court's qualified language in Holden, its victo-
ry in the case lulled the labor movement into believing that it had won 
the larger battle over the regulation of work hours, at least where dan-
gerous occupations were concerned. Writing a few months after the de-
cision, Florence Kelley termed Holden a "decision of the highest national 
importance."145 Once the Court had finally taken a position on the issue, 
Kelley believed, there would be no turning back. "Once for all," she 
wrote, "it is convincingly laid down by this decision that state legislation 
restricting the hours of labor of employes in occupations injurious to the 
health will not be annulled by the federal supreme court on grounds of 
conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United 
States."146 
Kelley continued to celebrate Holden in her book, Some Ethical 
Gains Through Legislation, where she wrote "[i]ncalculable importance 
attaches to this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, be-
cause it reproves and, in the end, must effectively check that blighting 
tendency of the state Supreme Courts."147 First and foremost, she had in 
mind here her own bitter defeat in Ritchie v. Illinois. Reading Holden as 
having settled the question of "[w]ho shall decide which occupations are 
sufficiently injurious to justify the restriction of the hours of daily labor 
of persons employed in them," Kelley singled out the Illinois Supreme 
140. See id. at 398. 
141. !d. at 392 (quoting Lawton v. Steele,152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894)). 
142. !d. at 395-96. 
143. !d. at 395. 
144. !d. at 398. 
145. Florence Kelley, The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Eight-Hours' Law, 4 AM. J. 
Soc. 21,21 (1898). 
146. /d. at 27. 
147. KELLEY, supra note 130, at 147-48. 
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Court for its arrogance on this question.148 At the root of the problem 
was that court's failure to defer to the Illinois legislature's finding on this 
issue. Within that context, she offered the following assessment of the 
Illinois court's investigative capacity: 
The court was naturally not in a position to investigate the 
conditions of work in the factories and workshops of Illinois. That 
is not its function. But the legislature of 1893, which enacted the 
statute then under consideration by the court, had been in a posi-
tion to investigate the conditions of manufacture throughout the 
state .... All this no court can do; it has no apparatus for such in-
vestigations .... 149 
The above comment, it is quite clear, was not intended to spur improved 
investigative capacity for courts, whose relative deficiency in this regard 
was inherent to their nonlegislative function. If courts had "no appa-
ratus" for factual investigations, this was as it should be, at least as far as 
Kelley saw things in 1905.150 She, along with much of the era's reform 
movement, would be in for a shock when, seven years after Holden, the 
Court reversed course in Lochner-and held work-hour limits in baker-
ies to be in violation of the Due Process Clause.151 By that time, Kelley, 
who lost her job as Illinois's Chief Inspector in 1896 following the elec-
tion of a new governor, was serving as the general secretary of the Na-
tional Consumers League, the organization whose name would soon 
thereafter become synonymous with the Brandeis Brief. 
Ill. FROM LOCHNER TO THE BRANDEIS BRIEF 
The Lochner decision and the Brandeis Brief have long stood as 
twin pillars of the formalist narrative. Within this narrative Lochner is 
identified with judicial antipathy towards review of legislative facts, and 
the Brief has been constructed as a groundbreaking corrective. Though 
the Lochner decision may well have been critical to the emergence of the 
Brandeis Brief, it was for converse reasons than those the familiar narra-
tive has long put forth. 
A. The Dangers of Bakery Work and Judicial Review: Lochner Across 
Three Divided Courts 
At issue in Lochner was the constitutionality of a New York law 
that limited work in bakeries and confectionaries to ten hours a day, or 
sixty hours a week.152 Convicted for violating this law, Joseph Lochner, 
148. /d. at 155. 
149. /d. at 156. 
150. See id. 
151. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,64 (1905). 
152. See id. 
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the owner of a bakery, challenged his conviction through three separate 
rounds of appeal, bringing his case before the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York/53 the New York Court of Appeals/54 and 
ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.155 A comparison of the 
opinions of the judges on each of the panels reveals the extent of disa-
greement over judicial review of legislative health justifications for work 
hours. 
During the first round of appeal before the New York Supreme 
Court, three of the five judges voted to uphold the law, while two dis-
sented without writing an opinion.'56 Writing for the majority, Judge Da-
vy began his analysis with the proposition that "nothing but a clear usur-
pation of power prohibited by the constitution will justify the judicial 
department in pronouncing an act of the legislative department unconsti-
tutional and void."157 In support, he cited both the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Munn v. Illinois and the New York Court of Appeals in Peo-
ple v. Budd, which, following Munn, upheld a New York act that set a 
maximum charge for elevating grains by stationary elevators.158 With 
these examples in mind, Judge Davy concluded, the circumstances at 
hand offered little reason to question the legislature's judgment: 
When we consider the intense heat of the rooms where baking is 
done, and the flour that floats in the air and is breathed by those 
who work in bakeries, there can be but little doubt that prolonged 
labor, day and night, subject to those conditions, might produce a 
diseased condition of the human system, so that the employes 
would not be capable of doing their work well, and supplying the 
public with wholesome food. 159 
Next, before the New York Court of Appeals, four of seven judges voted 
to uphold, though, under substantially divergent rationales.'60 Most im-
portantly, the judges differed on whether social legislation of the catego-
ry in question was indeed entitled to judicial deference and a presump-
tion of constitutionality.'6' Notably, this disagreement divided not only 
the majority from the dissenters, but also split the majority judges them-
selves, as the respective opinions of Chief Judge Parker and Judge Vann 
reveal.162 Invoking Holden, Chief Judge Parker warned against the ten-
dency of some courts to "substitute their judgment for that of the Legis-
153. People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902), affd, 69 N.E. 373 (N.Y. 1904), 
rev'd, 198 U.S. 45. 
154. People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373 (N.Y.1904), rev'd, 198 U.S. 45. 
155. 198 u.s. 45. 
156. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. at 402. 
157. !d. at 398. 
158. !d.; see also People v. Budd, 22 N.E. 670 (N.Y. 1889). 
159. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. at 402. 
160. Lochner, 69 N.E. at 381-82,389. 
161. See id. at 381 (Gray, J., concurring). 
162. See id. at 382 (Vann, J., concurring). 
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lature."163 As to the evidence justifying the classification of baking as a 
dangerous occupation in line with the Court's holding in Holden, Chief 
Judge Parker restricted his discussion to the following: 
The published medical opinions and vital statistics bearing upon 
that subject standing alone fully justify the section under review as 
one to protect the health of the employes in such establishments, 
and it is the duty of this court to assume that the section was framed 
not only in the light of, but also with full appreciation of the force of 
the medical authority bearing upon, the subject .... 164 
Judge Vann's concurring opinion began, by contrast, with an emphatic 
rejection of Parker's deferential stance towards the legislature's prof-
fered health rationale. Instead, he used the first sentence in his opinion 
to declare that "[t]he power of the Legislature to pass what it may con-
sider 'health laws' is not unlimited, but is bounded by the duty of the 
courts to determine whether the act has a fair, just, and reasonable rela-
tion to the general welfare."165 Making mention of neither Holden nor 
the principle of deference for which this case had come to stand in Par-
ker's opinion, Vann declared instead: "I do not think the regulation in 
question can be sustained unless we are able to say from common 
knowledge that working in a bakery and candy factory is an unhealthy 
employment."166 In an effort to address this question, Vann's opinion in-
corporates quotations from no fewer than twenty sources. Some perti-
nent medical journals and encyclopedias offered theories on why expo-
sure to dust predisposed workers to lung infection, and others compared 
mortality rates across various occupations.167 "The evidence," Vann stat-
ed, "while not uniform, leads to the conclusion that the occupation of a 
baker or confectioner is unhealthy, and tends to result in diseases of the 
respiratory organs. "168 The risk was not as great as that of "those who 
work in stone, metal, or clay," but sufficient to validate the legislation as 
a health law.169 In insisting on the court's duty to scrutinize the underly-
ing legislative facts, Vann was closer in principle to the view of the two 
dissenting judges in the case. Where Vann parted from the latter two, 
however, was over the capacity of the available evidence to withstand 
such scrutiny. 
The two dissenting judges who wrote opinions in the case, Judge 
O'Brien and Judge Bartlett, found that the evidence presented was insuf-
ficient to establish a valid health rationale. Of the two, only Bartlett di-
rectly engaged with Vann's arguments on the evidence supporting the 
law.170 In this connection, he particularly disputed the relevance of an 
encyclopedia article which found higher risk of consumption among bak-
ers exposed to dust produced in the course of grinding flour and sugarY1 
Because most bakers, by that time, no longer engaged in such grinding, 
163. /d. at 377 (majority opinion). 
164. /d. at 380-81. 
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Bartlett dismissed the pertinence of findings based on exposure to grind-
ing dust when it came to the dangers associated with the baking profes-
sion.172 
These same divisions remained in place when the case reached the 
Supreme Court. Writing for a majority of five Justices, Justice Peckham 
placed the burden of proof squarely on the State when he wrote: 
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote 
degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enact-
ment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to 
an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, be-
fore an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general 
right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to 
contract in relation to his own labor. 173 
The bakery law failed this test, Peckham concluded, due to the absence 
of material distinction between the dangers that bakers faced and those 
encountered in a long list of occupations-printing, carpentry, dry goods 
clerking, and banking, to cite a few. 174 The argument appeared to draw 
on information included in the appendix to Lochner's brief, which cited 
to a number of studies offering comparative mortality statistics across 
various occupations. 175 
Of the two Justices who wrote dissenting opinions in the case, Har-
lan and Holmes, only Harlan responded directly to Peckham's argument 
regarding the State's failure to prove that baking was a particularly dan-
gerous occupation deserving of special protection.176 Whereas Harlan 
disagreed with Peckham regarding this conclusion, his opinion suggests a 
shift away from his earlier rejection in Powell of judicial "investigations 
of facts entering into questions of public policy."177 Instead, similarly to 
Peckham, Harlan's starting point was "that in determining the question 
of power to interfere with liberty of contract, the court may inquire 
whether the means devised by the State are germane to an end which 
may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial relation to 
165. /d. at 382 (Vann, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
166. /d. 
167. See id. at 382-84. 
168. See id. at 384. 
169. /d. 
170. /d. at 389 (Bartlett, J., dissenting). 
171. /d. at 389. 
172. /d. 
173. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,57-58 (1905). 
174. /d. at 59-60. 
175. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 7, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (No. 292), reprinted 
in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 653, 660 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
176. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
177. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888). 
No.1] THE BRANDEIS BRIEF: ORIGINS OF A MYTH 85 
the protection of health."178 Where he differed from Peckham was over 
the amount of deference courts ought to grant legislative findings in this 
regard. All that was necessary, in his mind, for the law to be upheld as a 
legitimate piece of health and safety legislation was for the court to know 
"that the question is one about which there is room for debate and for an 
honest difference of opinion."179 He then proceeded to establish the 
presence of such disagreement by countering the authority of the infor-
mation Peckham cited on the relative safety of baking, with references to 
a number of treatises and medical textbooks that categorized baking as a 
dangerous occupation.180 In this, Harlan differed not only from Justice 
Peckham's insistence that "[t]here must be more than the mere fact of 
the possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness,"181 but also 
from the much more searching judicial oversight which Vann seemingly 
endorsed in the court below.182 
What distinguished Justice Holmes's dissent in the case, and set it 
apart from both Harlan and Peckham's approach, was an apparent effort 
to reframe the debate away from whether the ten-hour limit could 
properly be justified as a health law to the more fundamental question of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty necessarily 
required that it be so justified. The evidence for and against categorizing 
baking as a dangerous occupation or otherwise justifying the ten-hour 
limit as a health law received no mention in Holmes's dissent.i83 Instead, 
he aimed his challenge at the very premise that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protection of liberty implied that paternalist legislative interven-
tions in market ordering were unconstitutional per se.184 Holmes's cryp-
tic dissent was ambiguous on the circumstances under which a statute 
might be found to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The mes-
sage imparted, however, supported judicial deference not only regarding 
the means, but, more fundamentally, the ends advanced through legisla-
tion. 
B. Lochner: Why No "Brandeis Brief"? 
While the Lochner185 decision has become synonymous with formal-
ism in American legal history, what exactly made the decision formalist 
has not been easy to pinpoint. Those who have taken up this question 
have generally advanced one of two lines of argument. The first locates 
178. Lochner, 198 U.S at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
179. !d. at 72. 
180. !d. at 70--71. 
181. !d. at 59 (majority opinion). 
182. See People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 382 (1904) (Vann, J., concurring), rev'd, 198 U.S. 45. 
183. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
184. !d. at 75-76. 
185. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45. 
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the pertinent formalism in the reasoning process responsible for the 
Court's construction of freedom of contract as a protected liberty under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.186 This claim finds the key to Lochner's 
formalism in the Court's allegedly strictly deductive reasoning process, 
and, by extension, its failure to acknowledge the decision's economic and 
political context. The second claim is related to the first, but is quite dis-
tinct. It accuses the Lochner Court of buying into a laissez-faire ideology 
under which free bargaining unconstrained by governmental action was 
inherently desirable, taking as given the capacity of workers to bargain 
over the terms of their employment.187 In the latter case, formalism is a 
feature of the pertinent economic ideology itself, rather than the legal 
reasoning process responsible for reading that theory into the Constitu-
tion. In the first instance, it was the Court's alleged denial of the inter-
pretive choices involved through artificial deductive reasoning that is 
deemed formalist. By contrast, in the second case, it is the gap between 
laissez-faire's vision of freely bargaining individuals and the actual ine-
qualities impeding such bargaining that taints the theory, and by exten-
sion the Court, with formalism. 
Cutting across both understandings of Lochner's formalism is the 
shared assumption that, at the core of the case, was the constitutional sta-
tus of freedom of contract. But while the Court indeed considered free-
dom of contract to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, this 
conclusion was not in fact called into question by any of the parties to the 
case.188 Instead, the State of New York defended the ten-hour limit as a 
health measure, and, as such, a recognized exception to freedom of con-
tract.189 Justice Peckham alluded to this exception when he stated that 
"[t]he right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by 
this amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the 
right."190 Consistent with this statement, the main thrust of his opinion 
dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the health hazards 
associated with extended work in bakeries, rather than the constitutional 
186. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 558-59 (1996) ("The justices interpreted 
the concept of liberty broadly. They elevated property rights to the status of fundamental rights and 
treated some property rights as essential attributes of liberty .... They deduced rules from these natu-
ral law concepts, as well as from the common law, then employed formal reasoning to apply these 
rules to decide individual cases. Often they asserted that their decisions resulted from the formal ap-
plication of mandatory principles and rules, rather than from political or economic theories."); Freder-
ick Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 511 (1988) ("The formalism in Lochner inheres in its denial 
of the political, moral, social, and economic choices involved in the decision, and indeed in its denial 
that there was any choice at all."). 
187. Steven L. Winter, John Roberts's Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 549, 554 (2009) 
("Thus, in Lochner, it is the formal individual-that is, the one endowed with the same legal rights as 
every other- who is free to contract as he or she sees fit regardless of the economic realities."). 
188. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
189. ld. 
190. ld. 
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status of freedom of contract as such. The evidentiary question at issue, 
thus, was the existence of cause-and-effect relationship between a shorter 
workday and identified health benefits. The actual capacity of employ-
ees to bargain over the terms of their employment was irrelevant to this 
line of inquiry. If the Court gave short shrift to the health claim, it was 
not because it approached the issue through deductive reasoning or ab-
stract conceptions, but because it refused to defer to the judgment of the 
legislature and insisted on its own evaluation of the underlying facts. 191 
The absence of a "Brandeis Brief" in Lochner was not due to for-
malist aversion to facts (or the incompetence of the Attorney General in 
charge, as some have argued).192 Rather the decision to refrain from put-
ting forth a factual brief of this type can well be defended on strategic 
grounds. Having won in the lower court, and relying on Holden, Julius 
Mayer, the New York Attorney General, offered no concrete evidence 
on how workday limits in bakeries protected public health.193 Instead, he 
put forth a demand for judicial deference in the form of the following 
rhetorical question: 
Who shall say where the line shall be drawn in the exercise of the 
police power in a subject of this character? Shall it be the courts, or 
shall it be the Legislature, which must be presumed to have had be-
fore it all the facts upon which it could make a deliberate and intel-
ligent judgment?194 
The lack of scientific or other factual justification for the ten-hour limit 
in Mayer's brief for the State of New York sharply contrasted with the 
approach that Frank Harvey Field and Henry Weismann, the attorneys 
who represented Joseph Lochner in his challenge to the law, chose by of-
fering medical and statistical reports aimed at showing that "the baker's 
trade is fully up to the average healthfulness of all trades,"195 information 
on which Justice Peckham relied in his majority opinion, as mentioned 
before.196 
The incentives for including empirical evidence in the briefs differed 
substantially between the opposing sides in the case. Having lost across 
three rounds of litigation in the New York courts, Mr. Lochner had one 
191. See id. at 45. 
192. See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. 
NEW YORK 112-13 (1990) (presenting a range of potential explanations for Mayer's failure to match 
Lochner's data-laden brief with one of his own, including over-confidence, perceived tactical ad-
vantage in silence regarding the scope of the police power, Mayer's conservative political leanings, and 
his distraction by seemingly more important cases); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and 
the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19 n.77 (1991) (describing Mayer's brief as 
"pathetic"). 
193. See KENS, supra note 192, at 111-12. 
194. Brief for Defendants in Error at 16, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 46 (1905) (No. 292), re-
printed in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONALLAW,supra note 175, at 715,731. 
195. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 175, at 660. 
196. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
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remaining hope: his ability to persuade the Supreme Court that there ex-
isted no reasonable health-based justification for regulating the hours of 
work in bakeries. Conversely, for the state, there was little reason to re-
open the question regarding the law's justification once that had been 
settled in its favor. Moreover, even had they chosen to undertake this 
evidentiary effort, it would have been difficult for the state's representa-
tive to improve upon Judge Vann's opinion at the New York Court of 
Appeals.197 Rather than reiterate and elaborate on this information, 
Mayer's brief simply referred to Vann's opinion in support of "[t]he un-
healthful character of the baker's occupation. "198 Lochner's attorneys, by 
contrast, needed to refute the New York court's finding that the bakery 
law could reasonably be viewed as a health law if they were to overturn 
the lower court. Their success in this respect forced progressive defend-
ers of labor laws to return to the briefing strategy that was reluctantly ini-
tiated in Ritchie and prematurely abandoned after Holden. 
IV. FORMALISM AND THE BRANDEIS BRIEF 
Doctrinal uncertainty over the constitutional status of work-hour 
laws compelled their defenders to walk a tightrope between strategies 
designed to advance their preferred outcome-deference to the legisla-
ture-and those that offered the best chance of success in the event of 
judicial scrutiny of the underlying legislative facts. Both the Ritchie and 
the Muller briefs revealed this precarious balancing effort. 199 But where-
as the first resulted in failure and was soon forgotten, the success of the 
second retroactively transformed it from a reluctant concession into an 
ostensibly bold antiformalist strategy. The process through which this 
transformation unfolded is described below. 
A. "The Gospel Has Been Widespread": The Reinvention and 
Marketing of the Brandeis Brief 
In the wake of the Brandeis Brief an invigorated National Consum-
ers League (NCL) amended its bylaws to rename Goldmark's "Commit-
tee on Legislation" the "Committee on Legislation and on the Legal De-
fense of Labor Laws," and entrusted that Committee with the additional 
duty of assisting "in the defense of the laws by supplying additional legal 
counsel and other assistance."200 The change was emblematic of a larger 
transformation in the NCL's identity. What began as a reluctant conces-
197. See People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 382-84 (N.Y. 1904) (Vann, J., concurring), rev'd, 198 
U.S.45. 
198. See KENS, supra note 192, at 111; Brief for Defendants in Error, supra note 194, at 733. 
199. See Brandeis Brief, supra note 1; Brief and Argument of Defendant in Error, supra note 131. 
200. Clement E. Vose, The National Consumers' League and the Brandeis Brief, 1 MIDWEST J. 
POL. SCI. 267, 275 (1957). 
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sion to the evidentiary demands of the courts thus became a key element 
of the NCL's mission. 
Under the title Fatigue and Efficiency: A Study in Industry, Jose-
phine Goldmark published a book in 1912 detailing both the science and 
the strategy behind the Muller Brief, as well as others that have followed 
by then.201 There, in language that would become the standard descrip-
tion of the Brandeis Brief going forward, she illustrated the Brief's novel-
ty by pointing out that only two of its hundred and some pages were de-
voted "to the legal aspects of the case, and over 100 to a new kind of 
testimony-mankind's experience, physical and moral, with respect to 
women in industry and the duration of their working hours. "202 
Goldmark's concern in the book was entirely with what she termed "the 
new empirical evidence contained in the brief. "203 The legal arguments 
received no further mention, and were implicitly dismissed as irrelevant. 
Following Goldmark, discussions of the Brandeis Brief have rarely dwelt 
on its legal argument, long seen as tangential to the Brief's far more nov-
el and extensive empirical section. 
In truth, however, the legal argument-insisting that the law was en-
titled to a presumption of constitutionality in the first place-was the 
Brief's most important line of defense. It began with a reading of Loch-
ner that seamlessly weaved Justice Peckham's majority opinion together 
with Justice Harlan's dissent, in a fashion that led one to believe that the 
presumption of constitutionality suffered little erosion in the transition 
between Holden and Lochner.204 This was best evident in the Brief's cita-
tion of Harlan's language in dissent that legislation was to be upheld un-
less "plainly and palpably unauthorized by law."205 Notably missing, 
however, was any indication, with the exception of a reference to the per-
tinent page number, that the quote came out of a dissent, rather than the 
Court's majority opinion. In keeping with this strategy, the Brief's con-
cluding paragraph, citing Holden and ignoring Lochner, emphasized that 
the facts and legislative precedents presented were sufficient to refute 
the argument that the Oregon legislature "had no reasonable ground" 
for the law.206 Importantly, however, the Brief refrained from making the 
201. JOSEPHINE GOLD MARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN INDUSTRY (1912) 
202. !d. at252. 
203. !d. 
204. Brandeis Brief, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
205. !d. 
206. The full relevant sentence in the Brief reads as follows: 
We submit that in view of the facts above set forth and of legislative action extending over a peri-
od of more than sixty years in the leading countries of Europe, and in twenty of our States, it can-
not be said that the Legislature of Oregon had no reasonable ground for believing that the public 
health, safety, or welfare did not require a legal limitation on women's work in manufacturing and 
mechanical establishments and laundries to ten hours in one day. 
!d. at 113 (emphasis added). The italicized "not" in the quoted sentence was likely a typographical 
error. Making sense of this paragraph, however, requires us to surmise that the likely intent behind it 
was that "it cannot be said that the Legislature of Oregon had no reasonable ground for believing that 
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alternative positive argument, i.e., that the evidence showed that the leg-
islature had reasonable ground for the legislation, since that claim was 
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality under the Brief's legal ar-
gumenU07 
The pertinent empirical evidence cited a long list of authorities for 
the proposition that "women are fundamentally weaker than men in all 
that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the 
powers of persistent attention and application."208 This was later fol-
lowed by a quote attributing the female inferiority "in strength as well as 
in rapidity and precision of movement" to the presence of greater 
amounts of water in the blood and muscles of women, relative to men.209 
Elsewhere, the Brief alluded to what it described as a universally recog-
nized connection between "long hours of standing" and "pelvic disor-
ders."210 Moving from health to morality, the Brief explicitly linked long 
work hours with increased sexual promiscuity and alcoholism among 
women.211 As to the particular moral dangers women faced as a conse-
quence of long hours in laundries, which was the focus of the Oregon leg-
islation, the Brief quoted from a British study that blamed "[t]he preva-
lence of the drink habit" among laundry women on the "thirst-inducing 
effect" of the heat and chemicals typical of laundry atmosphere.212 
The Brief's success retrospectively confirmed the scientific respect-
ability of its medical and moral arguments, perhaps most importantly, in 
the eyes of the NCL staff. It was seemingly at this point that the formal-
ist narrative came forward to explain what took so long for these "scien-
tific" facts to make it to court.213 Subsequently obscured was the degree 
to which, in putting forth its medical and moral arguments, the Brandeis 
Brief won the court case only at the expense of capitulating to the con-
servative assumption that judges could review social and health legisla-
tion for factual errors. 
The historical premise that the brief was conceived as a vehicle for 
the public health, safety or welfare" required (as it in fact did} the ten-hour limitation. /d.; see Clyde 
Spillenger, Revenge of the Triple Negative: A Note on the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 5, 7-10 (2005}. 
207. See Spillenger, supra note 206, at 7-10. 
208. Brandeis Brief, supra note 1, at 18. 
209. /d. at 21 (quoting HAVELOCK ELLIS, MAN AND WOMAN: A STUDY OF HUMAN SECONDARY 
SEXUAL CHARACTERISTICS 155 (1894)). 
210. /d. at 28. 
211. /d. at 45 (quoting U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE, 48TH CONG., 1 RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR 
AND CAPITAL 647 (1883) (testimony of Robert Howard} ("Drinking is most prevalent among working 
people where the hours of labor are long.")). 
212. /d. at 46 (quoting Lucy A.E. Deane, Laundry Workers, in DANGEROUS TRADES: THE 
HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATIONS As AFFECTING HEALTH, 
BY A NUMBER OF EXPERTS 663,672 (Thomas Oliver ed., 1902)}. 
213. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 188-89 ("This attack on the juristic methods of the old order has 
been called the 'revolt against formalism' or the shift to 'scientific naturalism.'"). Horwitz subsequent-
ly offers the Brandeis Brief as an example of this shift. 
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providing judges with objectively valid scientific facts has rarely been 
called into question. Initially, the brief garnered unqualified adulation as 
the "spirit of modern science," but by the end of the 1970s, criticism of 
some of the substantive arguments and underlying methodology had be-
gun to emerge.214 Almost without fail, however, these critics explained 
the deficiencies in reference to the rudimentary state of scientific 
knowledge at the time.215 For example, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
noted in a speech that while some of the materials in the Brief "look du-
bious to the modern eye,"216 the "Brandeis brief purported to present 
'scientific' facts"' at the time.217 A particularly spirited defense of the 
Brief along similar lines appears in Melvin Urofsky's recent biography of 
Brandeis: "They worked with what they had, and when Brandeis claimed 
that the brief presented the 'facts of common knowledge,' these were in-
deed the facts as known at that time. "218 
Contrary to this assumption, however, it is possible to infer that 
Brandeis himself harbored doubts regarding the veracity of some of the 
evidence in his briefs. In oral arguments before the Supreme Court in 
1914, six years after the Oregon case, Brandeis presented another brief 
offering evidence on the link between insufficient wages and poor health 
and immorality among women. 219 Anticipating a question on whether 
"this brief contains also all the data opposed to minimum wage laws," 
Brandeis preemptively answered: "Each one of these statements con-
tained in the brief ... might upon further investigation be found to be er-
roneous; each conclusion of fact may be found afterwards to be unsound; 
and yet the constitutionality of the act would not be affected thereby."220 
As Brandeis went on to explain, the brief's scientific truth was simply ir-
relevant to the constitutionality of the law in question. The latter was to 
be presumed unless there existed "no ground on which they could, as 
reasonable men, deem this legislation [an] appropriate" response to a 
perceived problem.221 And when it came to meeting this minimal thresh-
old, all that mattered was the existence of a body of scientific or other-
wise expert opinion that suggested a connection between low wages and 
214. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO 
WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 57-61 (1978); David P. Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 
281,293-311 (1984). 
215. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 214, at 324 ("Obviously, criticism of the details of Brandeis's 
briefs should be tempered by a generous allowance for how long ago they were written .... Compared 
to the works of other social theorists of the time, the briefs-taken as a whole-do not sound extraor-
dinarily foolish."). 
216. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 359, 363 (2009). 
217. !d. at 365. 
218. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 222 (2009). 
219. Louis D. Brandeis, The Constitution and the Minimum Wage: Defense of the Oregon Mini-
mum Wage Law Before the United States Supreme Court, 33 SURV. 490,491 (1915). 
220. !d. at 521. 
221. !d. 
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the decline of women's health and morality. The scientific validity of this 
evidence was beside the point. 
In this respect, Fatigue and Efficiency reveals a crucial shift. Pub-
lished with the help of a grant the NCL received from the Russell Sage 
Foundation for a review of the literature on the connection between 
working hours and fatigue, the book cited and discussed a growing body 
of scientific work attributing "the pathogenic nature of industrial over-
fatigue" to "the unbalanced metabolism," an essential poisoning of the 
blood through the accumulation of waste products.222 Mostly coming out 
of Europe, this work supplied Goldmark the hitherto absent "statistical 
or definite proof of the causal connection between industrial overstrain 
and actual illnesses."223 With this missing piece finally in place, she sub-
sequently proclaimed, "science can give its authoritative sanction to la-
bor legislation. "224 Unlike earlier attempts to ground work-hour re-
strictions in the need to limit exposure to workplace toxins and dust, an 
"unbalanced metabolism" provided a rationale for limiting the workday 
across all occupations.225 In addition, the necessity of expelling toxins 
through rest provided a clearer rationale for limiting the length of the 
workday than the more indirect connection between extended exposure 
to pollution and other toxins in the workplace (along the lines of the ar-
gument used to justify, in Holden, limits on work hours in mines).226 
The NCL's sociological briefing strategy reached its high-water 
mark with the thousand-page brief it submitted in 1916 in Bunting v. Or-
egon.227 The case concerned an Oregon law that restricted work hours in 
all mills, factories, or manufacturing establishments.228 The brief urged 
the Supreme Court to distinguish the case at hand from Lochner on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence on the dangers of fatigue (citing the 
information Goldmark compiled in her book).229 When the Court upheld 
the law, the victory appeared to justify Goldmark's earlier quoted state-
ment on the ability of newly developing science to "give its authoritative 
sanction to labor legislation."230 The NCL responded with an extensive 
publicity campaign. It printed 4000 copies of the Bunting Brief and sent 
copies to "462 law schools, colleges, and libraries in forty-five states" as 
well as 717 individuals.231 "[I]ts gospel has been widespread," Josephine 
Goldmark wrote of the Bunting brief's wide-ranging, missionary-like, dis-
222. See GOLD MARK, supra note 201, at 115-16. 
223. !d. at 101. 
224. I d. at 9. 
225. Jd. at 115. 
226. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395-97 (1898). 
227. See Ginsburg, supra note 216, at 366. 
228. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,433-34 (1917). 
229. Brief for Defendant in Error at 63-173, Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
230. GOLD MARK, supra note 201, at 9. 
231. Vose,supra note 200, at 288. 
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tribution.232 
The briefs were for Goldmark part of a larger shift in the jurispru-
dential practices of the day, as she explained in Fatigue and Efficiency: 
[T]he point at issue had in fact wholly shifted from relation between 
the fourteenth amendment and the police the state's abstract right 
to restrict individual rights, to the practical necessity for every such 
restriction. The question was no longer abstract and legal, but rath-
er in a deep sense social and medical. It followed that the purely 
legal defense of these laws was falling wide of the mark. It had long 
been unreasonable to expect that judges, trained in schools remote 
from factories and workshops, should be conversant with those un-
derlying practices and conditions which alone could justly weight 
the scales. The men upon the bench needed for their guidance the 
empirical testimony of the working woman's physician, the factory 
inspector, and the economist. They needed, in a word, to know the 
facts. 233 
Here, we find, perhaps for the first time, an outline of what would be-
come the received wisdom, beginning with the notion that briefs includ-
ing extra-legal evidence were largely unprecedented and continuing with 
the juxtaposition between what was once "abstract and legal" and a new-
found emphasis on "empirical testimony" and facts on the ground.234 
By 1935 this narrative was deeply entrenched within the NCL. A 
pamphlet published that year in commemoration of the organization's 
thirty-fifth anniversary described the transformation brought about 
through the fifteen "Brandeis Briefs" the NCL presented by that time in 
the following fashion: "Never again can laws restricting, in the interest of 
the public health and welfare, the freedom of contract of wage-earning 
people be dismissed on mere legalistic grounds of precedent and abstract 
theory. Henceforth, the human aspects of such statutes and rulings are 
forever more to be the deciding consideration."235 The language here, 
similarly to Goldmark's words above, reads as a paraphrase of Roscoe 
Pound. 
B. Pound, Lochner, and Sociological Jurisprudence 
In a flurry of articles and lectures he produced during the decade 
immediately following Lochner, Roscoe Pound created the prism 
through which we have become accustomed to viewing the legal phe-
nomena of that era.236 Most important in this regard was the construed 
232. NAT'L CONSUMERS' LEAGUE, REPORT FOR THE YEARS 1914-1916, at 50 (1917). 
233. GOLD MARK, supra note 201, at 249-50. 
234. !d. 
235. NAT'LCO!"lSUMERS' LEAGUE, supra note 232, at 8. 
236. TAMANAHA, supra note 10, at 27 ("Roscoe Pound's 1908 'Mechanical Jurisprudence' was 
seminal in creating the image of judging as an exercise in mechanical, deductive reasoning."). 
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dichotomy between "mechanical jurisprudence" and "sociological" juris-
prudence.237 The argument depicting Lochner as formalist (abstract, de-
ductive, or mechanistic, in the terminology of the time) dates to this body 
of work, although Lochner was rather tangential to Pound's primary 
concern with private law, in these articles.238 Pound's role in the initial 
construction of the Lochner decision as formalistic merits a separate arti-
cle. The discussion here touches on this topic only so far as is necessary 
for understanding Pound's influence on subsequent formalist construc-
tions of the Brandeis Brief. 
The starting point in this regard is Pound's 1908 article "Mechanical 
Jurisprudence." There, writing partially in reference to Lochner, Pound 
offered the following argument: 
The conception of freedom of contract is made the basis of a logical 
deduction. The court does not inquire what the effect of such a de-
duction will be, when applied to the actual situation. It does not 
observe that the result will be to produce a condition precisely the 
reverse of that which the conception originally contemplated.239 
The familiar argument critiquing the Court's reasoning in Lochner as an 
exercise in misguided logical deduction likely makes its first appearance 
in this article. At the same time, we also find within this paragraph lan-
guage suggestive of the second meaning associated with Lochner formal-
ism, i.e., adherence to abstract principles as to workers' bargaining capac-
ity irrespective of the facts on the ground, as will be shortly discussed.240 
As Brian Tamanaha has noted, "Later generations of scholars have 
often repeated Pound's claims that judges engage in highly abstract con-
ceptual reasoning with little attention to real conditions. "241 But, " [a ]t 
the time, the main criticism of Lochner . .. was not that the judges, be-
guiled by an abstract understanding of liberty of contract, failed to pay 
attention to the facts, but the opposite."242 In support, Tamanaha quotes 
a critical essay Ernst Freund published in 1910 on Lochner and other re-
cent freedom-of-contract decisions whose conclusion was that "[n]o oth-
er construction can be placed upon these decisions than that the courts 
assume the power to look into the question of fact."243 
It is likely that Pound's thinking here was partly the result of his 
contacts and friendship with a number of social scientists, most im-
237. /d. at 27-28. 
238. /d. at 32-33 (citing Wilbur Larremore, Judicial Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L.J. 312 
(1905); Edward B. Whitney, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 3 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1904); Emlin McClain, 
The Evolution of the Judicial Opinion, 36 AM. L. REV. 801 (1902)). 
239. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 616 (1908). In addition to 
Lochner, Pound referred in this paragraph to the Court's decision in Adair v. United States. /d. (citing 
208 u.s. 161 (1908)). 
240. /d. 
241. TAMANAHA, supra note 10, at 36. 
242. /d. 
243. /d. (quoting Ernst Freund, Constitutional Labor Legislation, 4 ILL L. REV. 609,620 (1910)). 
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portantly the sociologists Edward Alsworth Ross and Lester Ward.244 
Pound cited Ward on the first page of his article "Liberty of Contract" 
where he contrasted Justice Harlan's statement in Adair v. United States 
that "the employer and employe have equality of right"245 with the fol-
lowing quote from Ward: "Much of the discussion about 'equal rights' is 
utterly hollow. All the ado made over the system of contract is sur-
charged with fallacy."246 The juxtaposition served to illustrate the gap be-
tween the theoretical assumptions behind constitutional conceptions of 
"liberty of contract" and the facts as seen through the eyes of social sci-
ence.247 He cited the progressive economist Richard T. Ely to reiterate 
the same point: "For one who really understands the facts and forces in-
volved, it is mere juggling with words and empty legal phrases. "248 
Unlike Lochner, the Court in Adair squarely confronted the consti-
tutional status of freedom of contract. The case concerned a federal law 
that prohibited employers from discharging employees on the basis of 
union membership.249 The Court invalidated the law after finding that it 
exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause as well as 
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.250 The criticism leveled in 
response from social scientists focused on the place of a fictitious concep-
tion of symmetric bargaining power between employers and employees 
within the Court's reasoning.251 The necessary corrective was for the ju-
diciary to remove the blinders that prevented it from seeing the structur-
al inequalities inherent to employment relations.252 Nowhere here is 
there any suggestion that courts investigate facts pertaining to the health 
justifications for social legislation, such as those at issue in the Lochner 
decision. This type of suggestion, as already discussed, would have been 
inconsistent with the progressive demand for judicial deference to legis-
lative fact-finding in this regard.253 By ignoring this distinction, Pound's 
article, by contrast, imperceptibly seemed to lump facts pertaining to the 
validity of the freedom of contract concept with those that spoke to the 
existence of health justifications for limiting its application. In this fash-
ion, Pound listed among the factors responsible for "American constitu-
tional decisions upon liberty of contract" what he termed a "sharp line 
244. JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 220 (2007). 
245. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908}. 
246. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909) [hereinafter Liberty of Con-
tract] (quoting LESTER FRANK WARD, APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 281 (1906)}. 
247. /d. 
248. /d. at 454 n.3 (quoting Richard Ely, Economic Theory and Labor Legislation, AM. ECON. 
Ass'N Q., Apr. 1908, at 124, 141). 
249. Adair, 208 U.S. at 168. 
250. /d. at 180. 
251. /d. at 187-88; see, e.g., Liberty of Contract, supra note 246, at 481. 
252. Adair, 208 U.S. at 187-88; see Liberty of Contract, supra note 246, at 481. 
253. See supra notes 77-151 and accompanying text. 
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between law and fact in our legal system," a line that he blamed, in turn, 
for the lack of "effective judicial investigation or consideration of the sit-
uations of fact behind or bearing upon the statutes. "254 
In viewing the gap between law and facts as the source of the judici-
ary's failure to adjust to the reality of industrial relations, Pound fol-
lowed in the path of leading social scientists during his time. But, where-
as the latter wrote from a perspective that was fundamentally skeptical of 
the policymaking function of courts, restoring the judiciary's capacity to 
respond to the problems of the times was the impetus behind Roscoe 
Pound's call for "Sociological Jurisprudence."255 As John Fabian Witt 
has written, "[i]f Ross the sociologist wrote that the law was losing its 
grip on modern social life, Pound the lawyer saw sociology as the way for 
law to reclaim its authority."256 Against a sense of rapid decline in public 
respect for judges and courts, Pound published in 1907 an article titled 
"The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence."257 In it he argued for the 
necessity of integrating contributions from the various social sciences in-
to legal analysis, if courts are to retain their policymaking function. 258 As 
he wrote, "[l]egal monks who pass their lives in an atmosphere of pure 
law, from which every worldly and human element is excluded, cannot 
shape practical principles to be applied to a restless world of flesh and 
blood."259 In other words, his goal was to rescue the common law from 
itself, or as he put it elsewhere in the same article: "[I]t is the duty of 
teachers of law ... to create in this country a true sociological jurispru-
dence, to develop a thorough understanding between the people and the 
law, to insure that the common law remain, what its exponents have al-
ways insisted it is-the custom of the people .... "260 Within a year of the 
publication of Pound's call for "Sociological Jurisprudence" the NCL 
launched its "Brandeis Brief" strategy, fusing in the process its own pro-
ject with that of Pound. 
C. The Limits of the "Brandeis Brief' Strategy and the Return of 
Judicial Deference to Legislative Facts 
According to a pamphlet published in 1935 commemorating the 
NCL's thirty-fifth anniversary, the NCL had presented briefs in approx-
imately fifteen cases.261 The NCL ran into the limits of its sociological 
briefs, however, when it tried to replicate the strategy it successfully used 
254. See Liberty of Contract, supra note 246, at 457-58. 
255. Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 609. 
256. WITI, supra note 244, at 220. 
257. Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 607. 
258. /d. at 610--12. 
259. /d. at 612. 
260. /d. at 615. 
261. NAT'L CONSUMERS' LEAGUE, THIRTY FIVE YEARS OF CRUSADING: 1899-1935, at 10 (1935). 
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regarding work-hour laws in the defense of minimum-wage legislation. 
In Adkins v. Children's Hospita[,262 which concerned a District of Colum-
bia minimum-wage law for women, Felix Frankfurter, who took over for 
Brandeis, justified the need for protecting women's income as a matter of 
public health: 
Charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the welfare of the 
women and children of the District of Columbia . . . Congress ... 
found that alarming public evils had resulted, and threatened in in-
creasing measure, from the widespread existence of a deficit be-
tween the essential needs for decent life and the actual earnings of 
large numbers of women workers of the District. The health of 
large sections of the present generation was thereby suffering from 
undernourishment, demoralizing shelter and insufficient medical 
care. Inevitably, the coming generation was thereby threatened.263 
A majority of the Justices (Holmes, Sanford, and Taft dissenting, and 
Brandeis recusing himself), rejected the argument this time around. The 
Court acknowledged that "[a] mass of reports, opinions of special ob-
servers and students of the subject, and the like, has been brought before 
us in support of" the benefits conferred through the operation of similar 
statutes elsewhere, but ultimately dismissed the information as "interest-
ing but only mildly persuasive."264 Resurrecting Lochner from what ap-
peared to be its near death in Bunting, the Adkins Court offered a long 
string of citations to Justice Peckham's opinion in the case, the bottom 
line of which was encapsulated in the warning that "[t]he mere assertion 
that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public 
health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must 
have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must 
be appropriate and legitimate .... "265 
In the wake of Adkins, the NCL's faith in its recent briefing strate-
gies was shaken. Florence Kelley, in particular, was moved to support a 
number of radical reform proposals including court packing and congres-
sional legislation declaring all legislation constitutional unless overturned 
by seven Justices (in the case of a state law), or a unanimous Supreme 
Court (in the case of federal law).266 In 1923, the NCL held a national 
conference to discuss possible responses to the Adkins case and pub-
lished the papers presented there in 1925 under the title The Supreme 
Court and Minimum Wage Legislation. 267 Roscoe Pound contributed an 
262. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
263. Brief for Appellees at viii, xix-xx, Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613 (D.C. Cir. 1922) 
(Nos. 3438 and 3467). 
264. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 560. 
265. !d. at 549. 
266. See Vose, supra note 200, at 276. 
267. NAT'L CONSUMERS' LEAGUE, THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION: 
COMMENT BY THE LEGAL PROFESSION ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CASE (1925) (hereinafter 
SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE]. 
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introduction to the volume in which he expressed "little faith in the pro-
jects which have been urged in the course of agitation aroused by judicial 
decisions on sociallegislation."268 Instead, in keeping with the principle 
behind his initial call for sociological jurisprudence almost two decades 
before, he wrote, "We shall find the true remedy not in ambitious politi-
cal programs but in a more scientific development of our law. We need 
to work out a better apparatus of informing the courts as to the social 
background of the statutes on which they pass .... "269 He favored this 
instead of propositions for recall of judges, referenda on judicial deci-
sions, or "requiring a different majority for a precedent on a question of 
constitutionallaw."270 Shortly thereafter, Roscoe Pound would part ways 
with the Progressive movement and go on to lead the American Bar As-
sociation's campaign for greater judicial oversight of administrative 
agencies. 
By 1938 the tables would turn once again, and economic legislation 
would come to enjoy presumptive constitutionality. The landmark case 
reviving this doctrine concerned the Filled Milk Act, which Congress 
passed in 1923.271 The Act, recalling the oleomargarine legislation of the 
end of the nineteenth century, prohibited the shipment in interstate 
commerce of "skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than 
milk."272 In United States v. Carolene Products, the Court upheld the 
statute against the claim that Congress had deprived manufacturers of 
compounded milk products of their property without due process of law 
when it declared that these products were injurious to health and a fraud 
upon the public.273 In rejecting this argument, Justice Stone noted that 
"The Filled Milk Act was adopted by Congress after committee hearings, 
in the course of which eminent scientists and health experts testified," ev-
idence that was later incorporated in the relevant legislative reports that 
were before the Court.274 But, in a historical shift, he went on to empha-
size that: 
Even in the absence of such aids the existence of facts supporting 
the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced 
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or gen-
erally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assump-
tion that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.275 
268. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE supra note 267, at 
xxvi. 
269. /d. at xxvii. 
270. !d. at xxvi. 
271. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co .• 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
272. !d. at 145-46. 
273. ld. at 148. 
274. !d. 
275. /d. at 152. 
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With the exception of gross indication of ill intent, legislative interven-
tion in the economy required no evidentiary justification before the 
courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in 1935, Felix Cohen, a leading figure in U.S. legal realism, 
memorably referred to the function of courts under the rational basis test 
for due process as "lunacy commissions sitting in judgment upon the 
mental capacity of legislators. "276 In other words, short of extreme irra-
tionality, legislation, under this test, was entitled to deference. Notably, 
he pointed to the Brandeis Brief as based in "some such conception" of 
the low bar sufficient for legislation to be upheld under due process.277 
The Brief, as Cohen described it, did no more than "marshal[] the favor-
able opinions entertained by individuals of undisputed sanity towards 
legislation restricting the hours of industrial labor for women. "278 Cohen, 
in contrast to many current commentators, seemingly harbored no illu-
sions regarding the objectivity of the Brandeis Brief's science. 
The political and legal requirement that social and economic re-
forms be framed as traditional health measures gave rise to a body of so-
cial scientific work aimed at providing the requisite justifications for leg-
islation. Whereas this reformist intellectual tradition is closely associated 
with the progressive era in U.S. history,279 its roots date back over a cen-
tury to the investigations of physicians such as Dr. Percival in Britain of 
the early nineteenth century. Much like their later U.S. counterparts, 
early nineteenth-century reformers cited "surveys, case studies, social 
experiments, and stacks of facts" to justify their missions in the face of 
growing social unrest.280 The frequently overlooked common denomina-
tor underlying both the early nineteenth-century British and early twen-
tieth-century U.S. incarnations of this intellectual tradition was the need 
to fit (often redistributive) regulatory interventions within a legal and po-
litical environment committed to market ordering. 
Labor laws acquired in this process a long list of medical justifica-
tions that, over time, grew to include not only the prevention of varicose 
276. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 819 (1935). 
277. /d. 
278. /d. 
279. As James Gilbert writes regarding the rise of social-scientific investigations during the pro-
gressive era, "[a ]rmed with the language of science and a fairly sure understanding of what they were 
looking for, reformers sought answers about society by studying its most glaring failures .... The 
enormous growth of fact-gathering organizations and the publication of their research helped to sup-
port the intellectual revolution which the collectivists preached." JAMES GILBERT, DESIGNING THE 
INDUSTRIAL STATE: THE INTELLECTUAL PURSUIT OF COLLEcnVISM IN AMERICA, 1880--1940, at 45 
(1972). Florence Kelley's investigations into workplace injuries and the statistics of child labor pro-
vide a paradigmatic example of this body of work. Batlan, supra note 136, at 244. 
280. HAMLIN, supra note 30, at 84. 
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veins and fertility problems, but also dissemination of germs and accu-
mulation of fatigue-triggered toxins.281 Some of these theories were well 
supported within the scientific conventions of the time, whereas others 
might best be described as creative speculations. Irrespective, they 
served to diffuse potentially violent conflicts by reconciling the enact-
ment of social legislation with the ideological suppositions of the reigning 
laissez-faire regime. For this compromise to work, it was essential that it 
not be upended by the courts. This goal was achieved, over time, 
through a variety of approaches. The first was British parliamentary 
sovereignty, the second, presumptive constitutionality, and the third, fol-
lowing Lochner, was the one epitomized by the Brandeis Brief. Because 
it made the fate of social legislation contingent on scientific proof, the 
latter approach signified a substantial increase in the power of the judici-
ary, relative to its two predecessors. In marshalling the evidence on how 
fatigue poisoned workers' blood or otherwise put them at risk, progres-
sives conceded the dividing issue across nineteenth-century police power 
debate: the authority of courts to distinguish true public health measures 
from mere pretext. 
If formalism was not the real obstacle before judicial review of legis-
lative facts earlier on, the formalist myth served in this context at least 
two related functions. In defining the pertinent problem as an inherently 
correctible judicial ignorance of the connection between social legislation 
and the protection of health, formalism bypassed direct engagement over 
the existence of substantive limits on legislation, in keeping with the 
longstanding progressive strategy. At the same time, this problem defini-
tion was consistent with the desire on the part of some progressives, most 
famously evident in Justice Stone's footnote four in Carolene Products, 
to retain the judiciary's ability to limit majoritarian power where the 
rights of "discrete and insular minorities" were at stake.282 From the van-
tage point of later twentieth-century writers, the Brandeis Brief served as 
proof of the value of empirical social science for progressive legal agen-
das. In this vein, historians have pointed to the Brandeis Brief as the in-
spiration behind the use of social science evidence in Brown v. Board of 
Education and many other cases.283 Along the way, we have lost sight of 
281. GOLD MARK, supra note 201, at 3, 9-42. 
282. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). On the emergence during 
the 1930s of "a new generation of liberals" who looked to the judiciary "to protect American rights 
from being trampled by a too powerful state," see Laura M. Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private 
Rights: Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 187, 198-99 (2009). Likewise, on "the evolving image of the Court as protector of civil liber-
ties" during the 1930s, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
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283. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link Between Law and Culture, 
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 450,455 (1988) ("The Warren Court also drew on the earlier efforts of Sociological 
Jurisprudence and Legal Realism to insist that legal rules cannot be evaluated outside of a social con-
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the fact that at issue at the start of the twentieth century was not funda-
mentally the legal methods to be used in judicial review of the emergent 
administrative state, but the substantive scope of that state's authority 
and the judiciary's role in policing its boundaries. 
text. The Brandeis Brief ... was a forerunner of the controversial footnote in Brown describing the 
sociological effects of segregation on black school children."). 
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